Environmental taxes and charges and EC fiscal harmonisation: Theory and policy by Mohr, Ernst
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Mohr, Ernst
Working Paper
Environmental taxes and charges and
EC fiscal harmonisation: Theory and
policy
Kieler Diskussionsbeiträge, No. 161
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Mohr, Ernst (1990) : Environmental taxes and charges and EC
fiscal harmonisation: Theory and policy, Kieler Diskussionsbeiträge, No. 161, http://
hdl.handle.net/10419/48008KIELER DISKUSSIONSBEITRAGE
KIEL DISCUSSION PAPERS
Environmental Taxes and Charges and EC Fiscal
Harmonisation: Theory and Policy
CONTENTS
by Ernst Mohr
• Command and control instruments (e.g. standards, permits and licenses) have not been very
successful in reducing environmental problems in the past. They should be replaced by
market-oriented instruments, such as a system of environmental taxes and charges. Such a
system would provide incentives to reduce the demand for polluting activities or to substitute
other goods for pollution-intensive commodities. Further, it would provide incentives to con-
tinually apply the most advanced abatement technology available.
• With international or global environmental problems on the upsurge, there is an increasing
role for environmental policy coordination at the Community level. Coordination of environ-
mental policy should in general stop short of a harmonisation of environmental tax and charge
rates, as differential tax and charge rates can very frequently be made compatible with the
needs of the completed Internal Market 1992.
• In the absence of transboundary spillovers, environmental policy can be completely decentra-
lised if polluting activities can be charged without using integrated control devices. If integra-
ted control devices are unavoidable, only the tax or charge base needs to be harmonised. Tax
and charge rates should be fixed by national authorities. Furthermore, if there are no trans-
boundary spillovers and if goods are taxed at the consumption level, only norms for the decla-
ration of polluting components should be set at the Community level. If goods are taxed at
the production level, an integrated market requires the harmonisation of tax bases and tax
rates at the cost of major environmental distortions.
• If there are international environmental spillovers and if side payments between countries are
not feasible, merely international diffusion norms should be set at the Community level. If
spillovers are global (e.g. in the case of the ozone hole and climate change), tax or charge
bases as well as rates should be harmonised at the Community level.
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Until very recently the almost sole approach to tackling the challenges posed
by environmental degradation was the application of instruments from the tool-chest
of command and control. However, command and control instruments - permits,
standards and licences - have performed poorly. There has therefore arisen the
conviction amongst many in the academic and political community that command and
control instruments in practice need to be replaced or complemented by a set of
different, novel environmental policy instruments. This set has become known
under the heading of market-oriented environmental policy instruments.
One of these market-oriented instruments can be found in the form of envi-
ronmental taxes and charges. Environmental taxes and charges, although proposed
for a long time by environmental economists [e.g. Baumol, Oates, 1988; Siebert,
1987] have so far found only very limited application in practice. In the Appendix
some examples of proposed environmental tax schemes are given. It is the intention
of this paper to investigate the rationale underlying this concept and its scope,
and the properties of a practical yet efficient system of environmental taxes and
charges in the Internal Market after 1992.
2. The Rationale Behind Environmental Taxes and Charges
The basic principle that governs the allocation of any commodity under market
conditions requires those who consume a scarce commodity to pay for its use.
Furthermore, the more a scarce commodity is consumed, the larger the purchasing
power forsaken. This creates an incentive to economise on the use of a scarce
product and thus, implicitly, to take account of the competing interests of other
potential users.
Market-oriented environmental policy views the environment as a scarce com-
modity and applies this basic market principle. The gist of the idea is simply to
issue private property rights over the environment and to permit its use, i. e. its
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the international conference on
"Economic Instruments for Environmental Protection", Rome, January 20, 1990,
sponsored by the Italian Ministry of the Environment and the COMITATO
NAZIONALE PER LA RICERCA E PER LO SVILUPPO DELL'ENERGIA NUCLEARE E
DELLE ENERGIE ALTERNATIVE (ENEA). I acknowledge the helpful comments by
Johannes Heister and Wolfgang Suhr.degradation by the emission of pollutants, only upon the payment of a price. The
intention is to thus give an incentive to individual decision makers to economise on
the use of the scarce commodity "environment".
The idea behind levying environmental taxes or charges is simply to give
these exclusive property rights to a branch of the public sector. The public sector
then sells the right to use - i.e. the right to pollute the environment - to inter-
ested parties from the private sector. Thus, an environmental tax or charge
system is a pricing system on environmental commodities.
Its objective is environmental protection by giving incentives to economic
agents either to reduce the overall demand for polluting activities or else to sub-
stitute pollution-intensive commodities by other goods [Suhr, 1989].
If properly set, such a system of environmental taxes and charges brings
about important advantages compared to a command and control approach. Under
the latter, economic agents have no incentive to limit environmental damage to the
quantitative or qualitative norms set by a permit or standard. Under the former,
economic agents compare the gain in money or utility terms from each marginal
environmental damage caused by them with the additional costs brought about by
the additional tax or charge payments.
This in turn has important implications. The tax or charge screens environ-
mentally damaging activities, such that decision makers subject thereto avoid those
actions where the economic benefit is below the relevant tax rate. However,
activities which cause a high economic yield compared to the tax are still under-
taken. In contrast, permits or standards do not discriminate between high and low
yield activities.
Furthermore, an environmental tax or charge system ensures that environ-
mental damage, caused by economic activities, is unprofitable to avoid under the
best available abatement technology. If the abatement of emissions costs less than
the associated increase in tax payments, abatement takes place. When a better
abatement technology becomes available the tax or charge system ensures that it
will be employed. In contrast, under a system of permits and standards an incen-
tive does not exist to abate emissions within the norms set. Furthermore, an
incentive does not exist to constantly use the best available technology.3. Properties of a Market-Oriented System of Environmental Taxes and Charges
The rationale behind market-oriented environmental policy instruments
suggests that a system of such taxes and charges has the following basic
properties:
1) An income or profit tax earmarked to finance environmental policy expenses is
apparently not a market-oriented environmental policy instrument. It creates an
incentive to avoid income or profit instead of environmental pollution.
2) Charges on activities or taxes on products levied to finance the costs of
environmental command and control measures also do not belong to the class of
market-oriented instruments. As an example take the German "Wasserpfennig".
It is a redistributive charge on the use of water. It is levied to compensate
farmers for losses due to the legal restrictions of applying fertilisers in certain
sensitive areas. The "Wasserpfennig" therefore does not create an incentive to
reduce the use of fertilisers below the norm set by environmental command and
control.
3) From the point of view of environmental policy, the relevant aspect of a charge
or a tax is the environmental incidence. Charges on activities or taxes on
products containing pollutants are thus environmentally equivalent if the
incidence is identical.
4) Taxes and charges are unsuitable environmental policy instruments if the
prevention of emissions of highly toxic substances (e.g. dioxine) is the ob-
jective.
5) Products containing pollutants (such as petrol, plastic bags, and electric
batteries) should only be taxed if demand is sufficiently elastic with respect to
the price.
6) The tax or charge should be linked as closely as possible to the pollution that
is to be controlled. Consider, for example, the containment of emissions from
car driving. A tax on fuel is more effective than a tax on car ownership. A
differentiated tax on diesel, leaded and unleaded petrol in proportion to the
content of pollutants is still more effective than a tax on fuel in general.
7) As pollution is in most cases directly caused by economic activities, the ideal
environmental instrument is a charge on the polluting activity itself. This
excludes incentive distortions and allows firms or households to exploit all
substitution possibilities or abatement technologies available. For example, a tax
on the purchase of pesticides is inferior to a charge on the emission ofpesticides as the former does not give an incentive to avoid seepage once the
purchase is made.
4. The Completion of the Internal Market: Potential Restriction on an Environmental
Tax and Charge System
Environmental taxes and charges have the property of indirect taxes. Indirect
taxes, however, are in principle subject to fiscal harmonisation in the EC in the
wake of the completion of the Internal Market [Commission, 1987]. Thus the 1992
initiative poses a potential restriction on the design of an environmental tax and
charge system in Europe. Environmental taxes and charges will therefore only play
a role in the EC if the designers of such a tax and charge system succeed in
making the needs of market-oriented environmental policy compatible with the
requirements of the Internal Market.
To ensure the functioning of free competition in the Internal Market, the
Commission has proposed a harmonised VAT system which would allow member
countries to set VAT rates between 14-20 per cent with respect to the normal rate
and between 4-9 per cent with respect to the reduced rate. Concerning other
excise taxes (cigarettes, tobacco, alcohol and mineral oils), the Commission pro-
poses to introduce the same tax base and the same tax rate EC-wide.
Following this, environmental taxes and charges would have to be levied using
the same base and at the same rate in each member country. Country-specific
environmental policy using differing taxes and charges would therefore be
prohibited.
However, under the subsidiary principle of Article 130r(4) of the EC Treaty,
environmental policy is exclusively the task of member countries if environmental
policy cannot be achieved more effectively at Community level. Furthermore,
Article 130r(2) permits a regional differentiation of environmental conditions. Thus,
in principle, member countries can set divergent environmental taxes and charges
for the purpose of regionally differentiated environmental conditions [Bongaerts,
1989]. This degree of freedom is in turn restricted by Article 100a, which
prohibits national environmental policy to impose arbitrary or hidden trade
barriers.
A system of environmental taxes and charges within the EC will therefore
have to take into account:
- the restrictions on national environmental policy due to the '92 initiative;- the restrictions on national environmental policy due to the subsidiary principle;
- theoretical considerations imposed by the effectiveness of market-oriented envi-
ronmental policy; and
- practical considerations governing the introduction and management of such a
system.
Particular environmental problems will have to be distinguished according to:
- the appropriate level of environmental decision making (national, bilateral, or at
the EC level); and
- the appropriate degree of environmental tax and charge harmonisation.
A sketch of a conceivable environmental tax and charge system in the EC is
given below.
5. Charging Polluting Activities - No International Spillovers, No Need for Inte-
grated Control Devices
There are several factors which influence the optimal tax or charge rate. The
abatement technology available, the state of the environment, consumer preferences
and consumer income are determinants of the optimal rate. In so far as these
determinants differ across countries, environmental tax or charge rates should
differ too. Since national differences with respect to these factors do exist within
the EC, environmental taxes and charges should in principle not be harmonised.
If the environmental problem at hand is a purely national one (e.g. the
pollution of a national water system or local noise pollution), EC authorities
possess no particular advantage over national authorities in environmental policy
making [ Siebert, 1989a]. Under the subsidiary principle, environmental policy then
ought to take place at the national level.
National differences concerning the rates and bases of environmental taxes
and charges will influence the international competitiveness of firms and goods.
However, to conclude that this will set the stage for a harmonisation at the EC
level on the basis of the '92 initiative would be premature.
Without international spillovers, the environment has the property of an
immobile'production factor. The environment as an element of national endowment is
therefore a determinant of the fundamental international competitiveness - the very
consequences of which are under the auspieces of the '92 initiative.
Consequently, charges on national water pollution by paper milling or
farming, on local dust pollution from industrial production, on aircraft noiseduring landing and take off - and the like - should be allowed to differ across
member countries. The structural change in industrial production, farming or air
traffic which is caused by these differences is desirable under both environmental
policy and Internal Market considerations.
Interestingly, disaggregated environmental policy features a tendency to
become more harmonised in a dynamic process [Siebert, 1989a]. Outcompeting other
countries or taking advantage of the correct initial comparative advange increases
the domestic environmental damage - by attracting polluting business from abroad.
This in turn exerts an upward pressure on charge rates at home and a downward
pressure abroad. Initial discrepancies in charge rates therefore tend to exceed the
differences in the long run.
6. Charging Polluting Activities - No International Spillovers, Use of Integrated
Controi Devices
Applying a charge to emissions of pollutants requires control devices which
measure emissions. This may cause a market segmentation and give rise to environ-
mental policy harmonisation under the '92 initiative. The problem here is due to
the degree of freedom in the choice of the charge base and associated control
device.
In the case of aircraft noise, for example, the relevant charge base is
decibels. Furthermore, a once-and-for-all inspection of a new engine type suffices
in principle to determine the charge for each aircraft using this type of engine.
Complicated control devices on board are not needed.
Consider, however, air pollution caused by driving. Potential tax or charge
bases are emissions (SO-, NO ), fuels (petrol, diesel), the commodity (cars,
trucks) or engine size (4, 6, 8, 12 cylinders).
Although the ideal base is emissions, taxing fuel might be considered more
practical. Suppose, for example, Italy decided to tax fuel while West Germany
decided to charge emissions on the basis of measurement by a control device
installed in the car.
Applying the country-of-origin principle to environmental regulation, Italian
cars exported to West Germany would be taxed on the basis of fuel consumption.
The country-of-origin principle, however, is impractical, since each member
country would then be required to run simultaneously as many charge or tax base
rules as the total number of such rules in the EC. The country-of-destinationprinciple must therefore be applied to tax or charge bases. Italian makes exported
to West Germany would then have to be refitted with the control device. This
would cause trade distortions.
Different charge bases, requiring different integrated control devices, there-
fore cause market segmentation. National environmental charge base regulation
which requires integrated control devices is comparable to national product
standards under the country-of-destination principle.
The requirements of the Internal Market initiative therefore call for a
harmonisation of the charge base. Charge rates, however, may continue to differ
across countries.
7. Taxing Products at the Consumption Level - No International Spillovers
Although charges on emitting activities are more efficient than taxes on the
purchase of products, practical considerations will often make the latter necessary.
For example, taxing the purchase of plastic bags at the retail level is easier than
charging for plastic components in household rubbish.
Under the absence of international spillovers, the production-factor paradigm
applies, and environmental policy is to be set at the national level. Neither
differing rates nor differing tax bases cause market segmentation if the
country-of-destination principle applies. For example, at the retail level plastic
bags, as such or depending on the content of certain polymers, may be taxed.
To facilitate the free movement of goods and the functioning of a dis-
aggregated environmental tax system, there is, however, a role to be played at
the EC level. The Community should set norms for the declaration of polluting
components in products at the production level, comparable to the declaration
norms for products in the US. Taxes levied in the country of destination, based
on information provided by this standardised declaration, would then pose no
threat to the Internal Market.
8. Taxing Products at the Production or Intermediate Level - No International
Spillovers
In many cases, for administrative considerations, taxes are easier to levy at
the production level than at the consumption level. This, however, causes various10
problems and should be avoided whenever possible.
In principle, just as in the previous cases, from the point of view of environ-
mental policy, the country-of-destination principle should apply with respect to the
tax rate. However, this would require a complicated clearing system that would
hardly be manageable even for a modest number of different substances under
taxation. Therefore, the country-of-origin principle must be applied although
pollution occurs in the country of destination.
The country-of-origin principle, however, causes unwanted distortions with
respect to both trade and the environment. For one thing, trade is distorted
because export prices do not represent the relevant (import country) endowment
with the factor "environment". For another, the quantity of pollutants contained in
products of the low tax country to be exported to the country with high taxes and
a scarce environment will be high.
Hence, when tradeables are taxed at the production or intermediate level,
both environmental policy and '92 considerations require a harmonisation of the tax
rate. Obviously, in this case a harmonisation of the tax base is also appropriate.
The costs of this procedure, however, arise from the negligence of regional
differences in environmental endowments. Furthermore, the proceeds from taxes on
exportables remain in the export country, while the import country is left with the
environmental damage.
9. International Spillovers, Side Payments
Consider next international spillovers of environmental damage, such as the
pollution of the Rhine, with France, West Germany and the Netherlands as the
parties involved. In the presence of international spillovers the question of the
appropriate degree of centralisation is more complicated.
From welfare theory it is well known that unilateral environmental policy,
taking account only of the domestic damage, would lead to an inefficiently low tax
or charge rate. Furthermore, arguments from game theory suggest that taxes and
charges are set too low even if the environmental policy of neighbouring countries
is strategically taken into account. This, however, does not imply that policy
coordination should take place at the Community level.
It is possible that bargaining at a bilateral or multilateral level can lead to an
efficient environmental policy where countries negotiate bilateral diffusion norms11
and individually set the appropriate domestic environmental policy to meet these
needs [Kuhl, 1987].
The drawback with international bargaining, however, is that in general an
efficient environmental policy is only possible if the pollutee is prepared to make
side payments to the polluter to pay for abatement at the source of pollution.
Thus, under side payments the polluter-pays principle is replaced by the victim-
pays principle.
Side payments carry the stigma of bribes and blackmail and therefore have
little chance of surviving in the EC political process.
10. International Spillovers, No Side Payments
If side payments are unfeasible due to political considerations, then bar-
gaining over environmental problems will fail to bring about environmental
efficiency [e.g. Mohr, 1990]. Hence, there is a role for environmental policy
coordination at the Community level.
Harmonising environmental taxes or charges, however, is not the first-best
policy. Again, differences between countries require differing tax or charge rates.
When international spillovers are present, country-specific differences with respect
to international flows of pollution - net export of emissions or leeway position -
further influence the optimal tax or charge rate differentials across countries.
It is to be expected that there are political pressures to harmonise environ-
mental taxes and charges when coordination takes place at the Community level.
This pressure should be resisted. It should be borne in mind that the costs of tax
harmonisation can exceed the gains from coordination [Feess-Dorr, Maug, un-
dated]. If this is the case, then from a welfare point of view, harmonisation is
even worse than a completely uncoordinated, country-specific approach. Put
differently, doing nothing about international environmental spillovers may be
superior to complete harmonisation.
Fortunately a feasible alternative exists. At the Community level bilateral
diffusion norms which have to be observed by each country could be set. This
would allow hotspots to be checked. Individual countries would then be free to
choose adequate national environmental policy instruments which meet these norms.
These would include differential tax and charge rates.
This policy could be carried even further. International spillovers could be
made subject to taxation. Under this rule a country would have to pay spillover12
taxes to the Community in proportion to its net pollution exports. This would
bring market considerations also into the containment of spillovers and could allow
a reduction of spillovers below the diffusion norms set in order to prevent hot-
spots.
11. Global Environmental Problems
Concerning global environmental problems, a harmonised approach at the
Community level is more appropriate. For example, the ozone problem, or perhaps
global warming, affects individuals in all member countries very similarly. Losses
from harmonisation therefore appear to be minor.
Tackling global problems requires efforts that go beyond the EC. Coordination
at the Community level, perhaps in collaboration with the US, could set a signal to
other polluters to follow suit.
12. Hybrid Problems
Real world environmental problems quite often feature more than one of the
above aspects. A few even feature all of them. Cars, for example, cause local
noise problems, international spillovers through air currents and contribute to
global warming.
The appropriate approach to tackling hybrid problems with the instrument of
environmental taxes or charges is to add the rates that would apply to each indi-
vidual problem alone. This is because the environment is a public consumption
good. For example, because the various services the atmosphere supplies (air to
breathe, a temperate ambient, protection from cosmic radiation) all contribute to
human well-being, the taxes representing the individual values for these various
services need to be added up. Coordination of the different components of the
total tax or charge rate are to be set at that level at which each individual rate
would be set under the absence of a simultaneous occurrence of other environ-
mental issues.
For example, under a system of taxes and charges intended to cope with
several aspects of atmospheric pollution, a harmonised tax rate (set at the
Community level to cope with global warming) would merely be a common base rate.
It would have to be augmented by rates varying in composition and magnitude, andBibiiothek
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set at the bilateral and national level. Thus, once again, the cumulative rates on
polluting activities and products would not be harmonised.
13. Taxes and Charges Versus Other Market-Oriented Alternatives
Environmental taxes and charges face potential competition from other
market-oriented instruments, from tradeable emission permits in particular. Each of
them has its merits and weaknesses [Hansmeyer, Schneider, 1989].
Environmental taxes and charges, for example, are encumbered by the fact
that rate adaptations which must be made in response to changes in underlying
determinants need be set in a political process. Furthermore, environmental taxes
and charges run the danger of gradually becoming a fiscal rather than an environ-
mental instrument [Bonus, 1989],
An optimal system of market-oriented environmental instruments in the EC
therefore is neither a system of taxes and charges alone nor only a system of
marketable permits. Rather, it contains components from both.
14. Dynamic Aspects
It cannot be expected that a system of environmental taxes and charges will
already have attained its final shape upon inauguration in the EC. It is therefore
necessary to design the system such that it features the necessary flexibility to
cope with changing needs.
Given the trends in environmental development as well as in human percep-
tion, it must be expected that taxes and charges will have to be introduced on a
larger scale before a technology is available which would permit a levy based on
the ideal tax or charge base. Thus taxes on fuel may be introduced initially
because control instruments to measure emissions from cars are yet unavailable or
too expensive.
However, it is also to be expected that pressure will be exerted on the
system to move into the direction of optimality. That is, there will be a tendency
to move the tax base downstream, closer to the emitting activity, in order to im-
prove the efficiency of the system. Taxes on products containing polluting sub-
stances may therefore initially be taxed at the production level, then at the con-
sumption level, only to be eventually replaced by charges on the emissions14
associated with the use of the product. Harmonisation at the Community level,
however, may pose a severe obstacle to this process.
A harmonised tax or charge base has some of the same important properties
as a technical standard. It has the tendency to fall behind the state of the art.
Under EC harmonisation, member countries may therefore face the problem of
having to apply an outdated tax or charge base, whereas under a national envi-
ronmental authority, a more advanced base would be chosen.
A conceivable escape route out of this technical conservatism under tax base
harmonisation would be to make a dual system admissible. Under this system each
member country would be bound to offer the standard "service" defined by the EC
standard tax or charge base. This would prevent market segmentation. Member
countries would be allowed, however, to run a second tax base if they were pre-
pared to bear the associated costs.
The country could then leave it up to firms, domestic or foreign, or to
consumers to decide on which of the two alternative bases their activities or pro-
ducts were to be taxed. The purpose of course would be to make the alternative
package of taxes - based on the more up to date tax base - so attractive that
producers or consumers would volunteer to fall under the alternative rule.
To give an example, suppose the EC standard base were to require driving to
be taxed on the basis of fuel consumption. A country could offer an alternative to
domestic drivers under which driving would be taxed on the basis of pollutants
produced. If a car owner decided on the latter he would be exempt from the fuel
tax levied at the petrol station. If in fact the alternative system were more
efficient from the environmental policy point of view, then it would be appropriate
to set the associated charge rate such that an economic incentive existed for
drivers to choose the alternative system.
A dual tax base system would also allow institutional competition [Siebert,
1989b] in the EC. This competition would mitigate the tax base conservatism that
harmonisation implies.
15. Conclusions
For the main results concerning the appropriate level of environmental tax
and charge harmonisation see the Synoptical Table.
In this paper a conceivable system of environmental taxes and charges in the
EC has been outlined. This structure is the result of considerations which tried to15
account for practical and theoretical requirements as well as for the needs of
environmental policy and the 1992 initiative.
There is a role for coordination at the Community level. With environmental
problems of an international or a global dimension on the upsurge, this role, will
become increasingly important. As a rule, environmental policy coordination at the
Community level should, however, stop short of a harmonisation of environmental
tax and charge rates. The findings suggest that differential tax and charge rates
can very frequently be made compatible with the needs of the 1992 initiative.
Environmental taxes and charges can therefore become an effective environmental













































































































































































































































Source: Bundes minis ter ium fur Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit, press
release, Bonn, 15. 8. 1986.18
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